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Italian and English Local funding networks: 




There is something of a crisis of confidence in European governance.  The European 
Commission itself has observed that:  
Political leaders throughout Europe are facing a real paradox.  On the one hand, 
Europeans want them to find solutions to the major problems confronting our 
societies.  On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions and politics 
or are simply not interested in them (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001, p. 3).   
This ‘alienation’ from government takes place at all levels of governance and is reflected 
in low voter turnout and a general refusal to engage with the political process in its 
traditional form, giving rise to single-issue parties and those of the disaffected (Wodak 
and Pelinka, 2001; Gallagher, Laver and Mair, 2005). The existence of policy networks 
within and indeed throughout differentiated polities exhibiting the characteristics of 
multi-level governance represents one way in which the process of government through 
governance takes place.  This paper explores one aspect of that by comparatively 
discussing Italian and English EU funding networks.   
 
By using the concept of policy networks, previous studies analysed the relationships 
between local authorities, central government and European Union in Britain. They 
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provided a map of actors participating in EU regional policy networks and they 
differentiated between networks at sub-national, national and European levels (Anderson, 
1990; Moravscsik, 1993; Borzel, 1996; Marks, 1993; Rhodes, 1997; Garmise, 1997). 
Certainly the differentiated policy model, developed by Rhodes to explain the changes 
occurring in the UK, recognised that those changes were accelerated by the UK’s 
membership of the EU and by that body’s impact on member states through increased 
integration, or Europeanisation (see also Zerbinati, 2004).  This approach recognises an 
emphasis on governance rather than government, which is a situation of power 
dependence and exchange relationships within and between networks and the actors that 
comprise those networks.  It views policy networks as a medium of policy making as a 
result of and sometimes giving rise to a segmented and sometimes fractured executive, 
with intergovernmental relations emphasising diplomacy and negotiation between the 
parties located within a ‘hollowed-out’ state (Rhodes, et al, 2003, pp.151-167; Richards 
and Smith, 2002, p.6).  Multi-level governance is a reality that exists in several forms in 
different contexts.  It also recognises the role of regional political organisations, 
devolution, federalism, professional groups, international corporations and other 
transnational organisations in governance.  There needs to be recognition of the weakness 
of some national members of the policy network in relation to others.  The concept of a 
policy network also involves the concept of a hegemonic element.  Through policy 
networks powerful actors criss-cross the structures of governance.   
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This article contributes to the understanding of local governance by examining the 
European funding networks developing within local areas which were eligible under 
Objective 2 of the Structural Funds. The aims of this article are therefore to: 
 
1) Describe the EU funding networks developed at local government level within a 
small group of European local councils – five local councils in Piedmont, Italy 
and five in Yorkshire, England; 
2) Explore the relationship (if any) between the presence of local EU funding 
networks and success in absorbing EU funds  
 
The article is structured as follows: 
 
Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature and it addresses relevant gaps that this 
paper aims to accomplish. It starts by reviewing the policy network literature and 
showing how policy networks help explaining the new phenomenon of local governance. 
It then addresses the issue of similarity between the two concepts of network and 
partnership. Section 3 discusses the methodological choices taken in developing the 
research. Section 4 describes the local networks, which took part in the EU Structural 
Funds competition and their participating organisations. It analyses variances between 
two European regions - Piedmont and Yorkshire - and between successful and 
unsuccessful cases. Section 5 presents some important points of discussion which 
appeared from the comparative analysis of the local networks within Italy and England. 
Section 6 concludes the paper by presenting its research contributions and limitations. 
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2) Literature review 
 
The increased instability of state-interest group relationships and the growth of a number 
of participants in the policy process gave rise to the network metaphor to explain the 
critical changes in the political governance of modern democracies (Rhodes and Marsh, 
1992; Parsons, 1998; John, 2001). Rhodes (1988; 1992) adopted a definition of policy 
networks as groups of organisations connected by resource dependencies. He provided a 
classification of networks, listing five types spanning a continuum from highly integrated 
policy communities to loosely integrated issue networks. Policy communities represent a 
special type of highly integrated policy network, with stable and restricted membership 
and shared responsibilities for delivering services. In contrast, issue networks are 
characterised by loose, open and shifting constellations of actors. The networks analysis 
focuses on resources that actors have at their disposal, the value systems applied in the 
policy community, the rules of the game and strategies used (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; 
Rhodes, 1981). In his analysis Rhodes differentiated between three levels of analysis. The 
macro level is represented by the policy arena; the meso level refers to the interactions 
between organisations and their power relationships; the micro level refers to 
interpersonal relations. Policy network is a meso-level concept and looks at the structural 
relationships between political institutions (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Rhodes, 1990). 
 
The concept of policy-networks was applied to several empirical studies on European 
policy-making, attempting to explain a new phenomenon known as Multi-Level 
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Governance (MLG). MLG emphasized power-sharing and interactions between three 
different levels of government. “Variable combinations of governments on multiple 
layers of authority - European, national, and sub-national - form policy networks for 
collaboration. The relations are characterized by mutual interdependence on each other’s 
resources” (Hooghe, 1996: 18). This group of literature analysed the local and regional 
governments within a European context and identified some interesting situations. 
Subnational governments established offices in Brussels where they participated in dense 
networking between themselves and other EU organisations. They lobbied for their own 
interests and, at the same time, they provided the European Commission and the 
Parliament with expert viewpoints on all issues concerning the European regional policy. 
Maintaining an office in Brussels denoted a form of insurance against unpredictable 
events; it represented an efficient way of knowing in advance any policy changes that 
would occur. Also, it provided opportunity to the subnational governments to create 
opposition for unwanted changes and to influence policy outcomes (Marks, 1993, 1996; 
McAleavey, 1993; Smyrl, 1996; Hooghe, 1996; Benz and Eberlein, 1998). The desire to 
gain access to EU funding together with the mutual sharing of experiences and creating a 
lobbying force at the EU level bypassing the national government where the added values 
to those interregional networks (Martin and Pearce, 1993; Chorianopoulos, 2002). 
 
The analysis of EU-national-local levels of governance lightened up a debate about the 
impact of domestic policy structure on policy network formation. Anderson (1990) 
argued that domestic regional policies generated distinctive networks which reflected 
underlying constitutional differences. Local and regional authorities indirectly would 
 6 
influence EU policy by lobbying their respective governments, while member states 
bargained with each other at the European level (known as the state-centric approach) 
(Moravscsik, 1993; Anderson, 1990). Rhodes (1997) presented the state-centric and the 
MLG approaches as mutually inclusive. In England, the central government maintained 
the role of gate-keeper: it influenced access to the networks and controlled the 
implementation of the structural funds. It created Government Offices (reporting to the 
central government) for the control and co-ordination of the structural funding 
applications (state-centric factors). Also, most English local authorities became more 
sophisticated lobbyists, setting up offices in Brussels. They appointed full-time European 
specialists to deal with the increasing number of networks both domestic and European. 
Finally, local authorities assisted to the introduction of new actors to regional policy 
networks which included the local community, voluntary organisations and the local 
businesses (Goldsmith, 1993; Barber and Millns, 1993; Garmise, 1997; Rhodes, 1997) 
(MLG factors).  
 
The emergence of a multi-level governance has been associated with the concept of local 
governance. Local governance refers to the new trend of local authorities to cooperate 
and share responsibilities together with the private sector and more generally the local 
community (Geddes, 2005). It is a complex and fragmented environment where local 
government faces the challenge to assemble and lead local partners (Sullivan et al., 
2006). The interaction and cooperation of public, private, and voluntary sectors within 




It is difficult to find a definition of partnership (Southern, 2002). Indeed, even more 
difficult is to differentiate the concept from that of network; often the terms partnership 
and network are used interchangeably. Some important findings emerged on the 
operation of local partnerships. Firstly, the public partners (or organisations) tended to 
have more power and a dominant role over the other members, while the voluntary 
organisations often lacked any power (Geddes, 2000; Foley and Martin, 2000). Secondly, 
partnerships seemed to operate through informal networks. It is at the informal level that 
the private sector can affect the local policy-making decisions (Harding et al., 2000). A 
partnership is characterised by a distinct organisational identity which may include 
executive, management and consultative bodies in the form of steering groups (Wilson 
and Charlton, 1997). What the above group of literature defined as local partnership, 
Provan and Milward (2001) called community networks. In their evaluation of network 
effectiveness, the authors stated that effective networks had a network administrative 
organisation (NAO), therefore a distinct organisational identity at least in administrative 
terms. 
 
In summary, policy networks helped describing and analysing the new governing 
structures of the 1990s. Functional policy networks had expanded to include more actors, 
especially from the private and voluntary sector. While some of the literature focused on 
policy networks at the EU-national-regional levels, little is known about the policy 
networks developed at the local level between the local councils and their local actors 
(Martin and Pearce, 1993; Rhodes, 1997; Martin, 1998; Boland, 1999). Also, most of the 
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research investigated Central and Northern European countries while the Southern 
European Countries are still under-researched. Especially, there is no research about 
Italian local government networks. Moreover, the analysis of European regional policy 
and structural funds has been mainly descriptive (showing the increase in networking 
practice between sub-national, central governments and the EU) while the link between 
policy networks and success in funding absorption has not been examined.   
 
This article attempts to fill the gaps identified in the policy networks’ literature by 
investigating local networks developed around the European structural funds in two EU 
countries, Italy and England. An attempt is made to explore the link between local 
European funding networks and the absorption of EU funding by the local councils 
involved. 
 
3) Context and Methods  
 
Context 
Italy and England were chosen for their institutional differences in the political and 
administrative systems with the aim to strengthen the generalizability of the findings. It is 
important to take into account the following institutional differences. 
Italy is a country of enormous differences and contrasts. The territorial differences as 
well as the ruling of different countries such as France, Spain and the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire throughout its history had an important impact on the development of the Italy’s 
sub-national government. Also the existence of Vaticano, like a state in the state, it 
contributed to wider the differences between North and South. It was only in the 1870s 
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that Italy’s territorial and political unity was completed, adopting the Napoleon system of 
public administration as a model. A first attempt to respond to the needs of modern 
administration was contained in the 1948 Constitution. The territory was then divided 
into the current three-tier system (Spence, 1992; Sbragia, 1998).  
The regions, the provinces and the communes consist of three bodies - consiglio, giunta, 
presidente/sindaco1. The written constitution has the role to protect the existence and 
powers of the three tiers. A Constitutional Court (Corte Costituzionale) adjudicates on 
disputes over power and actions between central and local governments (Spence, 1992). 
The following section analyses the Italian local government structure focusing on the 
changes introduced recently by the law 142/90. 
Introduced by the republican constitution just after the war, the regions have been 
operational only since the late 1970s. The Constitution confers a vast range of power to 
the regions. Therefore, if the central government has the duty and responsibility to make 
laws, to govern and to administer at a more general level, the regions have the 
responsibility to make law, to govern and to administer at the regional level (Garelli, 
Saccomani, 1995). 
The regions are responsible for a large number of administrative and political tasks such 
as: social welfare, local transport, culture and education, regional planning, water supply, 
agriculture, fishing, tourism, and local commerce. They can operate independently from 
the central government in the subjects mentioned above, but are dependent on the central 
government from a financial point of view. This situation makes Italy a half-way case on 
the spectrum of types of government with at the extreme the unitary system represented 
by British system and on the other side the federal system such as the German case 
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(Spence, 1992). Following article 2 of the l.142/90, the region is now responsible for 
regulating the co-operation between local authorities on the formation and refining of 
development programmes. Even if introduced as a law of principles (it gives indications 
on what could be but does not clearly introduce changes), the l. 142/90 can be seen as an 
attempt at decentralisation of local government with a further empowerment of the 
regions. 
The province represents the second tier of the Italian system. After the introduction of the 
reform of 1990 (l.142/90), the provinces saw their roles recognised and their functions 
grouped into two categories: areas in which the province plays a formal administrative 
role (environmental protection, local transport networks, public health, and some 
activities in the area of education and training, protection of spring waters, protection and 
maintenance of properties with cultural or historical value, regulation of hunting and 
fishing, collection and analysis of data, administrative and technical assistance for the 
communes), and areas in which it is assigned a purely planning role (intermediation 
between municipalities and regions in land use and development planning). The new 
regulation has broadened the power and the activities of the provinces, which have also 
been entitled to a larger amount of income. The province becomes an intermediate 
element (or natural unit of aggregation) between the region and the communes with 
specific responsibilities such as programming and planning the territory. However, the 
regions have the responsibility to determine the functions and actions of the provinces, as 
well as the communes. They can also redefine the territory of their provinces (l.142/90) 
(Cammelli, 1990).  
                                                                                                                                                 
1
 Consiglio or committee; giunta or board, presidente/sindaco or president/major. 
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The commune is the last tier of the Italian political-administrative system and is well 
known for its chronic fragmentation. The national territory has 8,066 communes, which 
vary in size of population and area. Piedmont2 on its own has 1209 communes of which 
634 have a population of less than a thousand.  
It was at the end of the 1970s that the communes started to exercise an active role (Spalla, 
1995). More recently, the law no.142 of 1990 enlarged the commune’s functions, giving 
them more autonomy. Local government functions can be summarised into four broad 
categories: 
 Constitutive, organising its own activities, administration and structure; 
 Regulative, organising and supervising over assistance, commerce, agriculture 
and protection of environment; 
 Distributive, delivering services such as education, culture, health protection, 
transports; 
 Planning in economy, urban development, road networks, culture, and services. 
Some of the functions are carried out carried out by the relevant departments, while 
others are passed on to municipal enterprises (e.g. the municipal transport agencies, the 
enterprises involved in the supply of gas, electricity, dairy products and water, as well as 
street cleaning and pharmacies). Recently, the local councils were also affected by a 
process of privatisation of services such as local transport.  
 
England lacks a codified constitution and central government is the only institution with 
the power to formulate laws. Therefore, local government functions derive from 
                                                 
2
 Piedmont is a region north-west of the Italian territory with Turin as its capital. 
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Parliament and specific statutes. The succession of labour and conservative governments 
contributed to the development of an hybrid local government structure which comprises 
a mix of single and two tier elected multi-purpose authorities: county councils and district 
councils represent a two-tier structure which include parishes; unitary authorities 
represent a single tier local government (see table 1).  
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Generally, local government comprises a chairman, who is elected annually by the 
council among its own members, and councillors, who are elected by the electors every 
four years. It was only in the late 1990s under the Blair Government that directly elected 
mayors were introduced to tackle public disenchantment with politics (Gray and Jenkins, 
1998). The new government introduced also a new institution at the regional level next to 
the already existing Government Offices. The Regional Development agencies, which 
were approved by the Government on 12th January 2000 are responsible for the economic 
planning and development of the territory and they are expected to operate a leading role 
on European funding (DETR web site, 2000). 
All counties functions can be summarised as follows: transport and highway, fire and 
police services, consumer protection, refuse disposal, schooling and education services 
(except FE and HE), social services, including housing, museums, art galleries and 
recreational facilities. Generally speaking, the districts are responsible for the 
maintenance of streets and bridges, the local sewerage and drainage, refuse collection and 
other sanitary services; it provides public entertainment and libraries. The metropolitan 
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boroughs or districts however are local education authorities and are responsible for 
libraries and personal social services. Unitary authorities instead represent single tiers of 
local government and they provide all local government services in their areas. They can 
run their schools and social services.  
 
Methods 
In-depth case studies were conducted among ten European local governments: five in the 
English region of Yorkshire and Humber and five in the Italian region of Piedmont. The 
profile of the Councils and the amount of structural funds they acquired are presented in 
table 2. The two regions were selected for their similarities in economic development and 
eligibility for European funding. Both the regions were ex-industrial areas with high 
unemployment and low economic growth. Those characteristics made them eligible for 
Objective 2 of the EU Structural Funds programme. Objective 1, 2 and 5b of the 
Structural Funds (which represented the biggest part of the funds) were limited to specific 
areas of the EU.  The local government units within the same area competed between 
themselves for the acquisition of funds from the regional pot. Rules and criteria for 
funding applications were laid out in the Single Programming Document in England and 
the DOCUP in Italy.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
The authors adopted a theoretical sample by selecting one successful and one 
unsuccessful case for each region. Successively, three additional local councils were 
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analysed within each region, following a replication logic (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Gersick, 1988; Yin, 1994). The researchers stopped after observing that all the results 
were highly consistent. In selecting the remaining 6 local councils (three for each region) 
the researchers tried to include cases from different geographical areas within the regions 
and different types of councils (unitary authority and metropolitan borough in England, 
and communes of various sizes in Italy, including provincial and regional capitals). Table 
2 summarises the profiles of the local councils investigated.  
Successful local councils had a healthy and steady flow of funds from the EU structural 
funds pot, whereas unsuccessful councils had not entered the funding competition, in 
relation to Objective 2 of the structural funds (see Figure 1). The financial data were 
provided by the departments within the regions responsible for monitoring the EU 
Structural Funds, and they were successively cross-referenced with the data provided by 
the local councils. The local European funding networks from the two countries were 
successively compared in order to identify similarities and differences.  
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Data were collected using multiple sources of evidence, known as the triangulation 
principle (Yin, 1994), which increased the validity and reliability of the study (see table 
3). 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
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4) Local European Structural Funds networks and their key organisations 
 
The English local councils. 
 
The four successful cases within Yorkshire and Humber region showed that formal and 
organised networks existed, which tried to maximise the absorption and use of the EU 
structural funds, while contributing to the regeneration of the local area. These networks 
were grouped by the authors under two general headings: Local Regeneration Network 
and Local European Funding Network.  
 
The Local Regeneration Network (LRN) included the local strategic bodies which dealt 
with regeneration and funding issues for the whole borough. It included the local council, 
local voluntary organisations, the chamber of commerce and the local community. It also 
included regional members such as officials from the Regional Development Agency 
(RDA) and a member of the Government Office for Yorkshire and Humber (GOYH). 
The network was responsible for creating a strategy for the local area which was then 
included in the official document named the Local Action Plan (LAP)1. The Local 
Regeneration Network worked closely with other similar partnerships whose remit 
extended beyond the borough. These external links facilitated the sharing of ideas and 
best practice between regions. A network administrative organisation was created in each 
one of the four boroughs analysed and they were named Regeneration Forum or 
Regeneration Partnership.  
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The Local European Funding Networks (LEFN) administered all the activities related to 
European funding and developed a strategic plan for the absorption and use of European 
funding. It identified the possible EU funds applicable to the local area and located 
potential organisations which could have a stake in the project and could bring in match 
funds. Normally, the European Network would appear as the first place of contact for the 
local organisations involved in developing EU funded projects. The network would 
provide support in designing the project which would than be submitted to the GOYH for 
approval. Endorsement by the European Network was necessary before the projects could 
be sent to the GOYH. In this way, the network could control over the quality of the 
projects submitted and also avoid replication of similar projects and therefore 
competition among the local partners. In case of successful bids2, the European Network 
would provide expertise in the day-to-day administration of the project. It would also 
check over its development. The group operated as a forum for the dissemination of 
information on European issues to the partners. Members of the group included European 
Officers3 and senior managers from partner organisations (the local city council, SMEs, 
the chamber of commerce, local colleges and Universities, the local voluntary 
organisations, and some groups within the local community which were interested in EU 
funding such as the farmers’ association). Specialised sub-groups within the network 
dealt with specific areas (or wards) characterised by higher needs for regeneration and 
therefore representing easier targets for absorbing the EU funds. Some of the sub-groups 
focused on specific priorities of the Objective 2 programme such as the Priority 4 Group, 
the ESF Group, and the Community Initiative Group.  
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Apart from the Local European Funding Networks and the Local Regeneration Networks 
the four English councils participated in networks at different governmental level: the 
regional and the European level of networks appeared the most common. At the regional 
level the network included the GOYH, which administered the Structural Funds, the 
Yorkshire Forum, which represented the RDA for Yorkshire, the Association of West 
Yorkshire Authorities (with the main objectives of securing Objective 2 status for the 
whole area) and the South Yorkshire Forum, a sub-regional partnership for the 
regeneration and development of South Yorkshire and with particular attention to 
creating a strategy for the Objective 1 programme. Also, all the cases appeared well 
connected at the EU level. The European level included contacts with MEPs, European 
officers from the DGs, European Commission, and Committee of the Regions.  
 
The interviews showed that the contacts between the local public officers and the 
European officers took the form of informal, non-institutional networks. As described by 
the spokesperson, the visits to Brussels with the people from relevant DGs, such as DG 
Agri and DG Regio, were mainly informal and they took place mainly at the initial stage 
of policy design as a form of pre-consultation. 
We have informal discussions, and that’s all we can have as local authority, 
because at the end of the day the formal negotiating process was held by our 
government office on behalf of the UK government with the Commission. In 
practice, a lot of the work was done behind the scene between individuals on an 
informal or semi-formal bases… Before starting this job, I worked at the 
regional office in Brussels. It was during that period that I met a lot of important 
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people especially at the European Commission. I keep in touch with them 
regularly because they represent invaluable source of information. Sometimes it 
happens they contact me as well to learn about specific data on British local 
councils without going through the institutional channels of communication with 
the government (Interview, a senior manager, Council 1). 
 
The links developed between the European officers working for the local government and 
the MEP and the European Commission members did not show any institutional network, 
but they referred to more informal non-institutional or non-organised networks of 
professionals, all having expertise on EU funding procedures and policy-making. During 
the policy design phase local government was “not allowed” to participate to such a circle 
of elite. Therefore, informal types of networks were developed with the European 
Commission in order to overcome central and regional governments, often with the aim 
to push domestic interests. Personal/informal networks allowed direct communication 
between the local councils and the local community on one side and the EU officers on 
the other; helped the former to gain a better understanding of the rules of the EU funding 
competition and facilitated their success in attracting EU funds. 
 
Council 2 represented the unsuccessful case. At the time of interviews, Council 2 was not 
eligible for EU funding and did not have a funding network, although it suffered similar 
problems: the closure of important local businesses and the rising of unemployment 
levels (see Table 4).  
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<Table 4 about here>  
 
Interviews with a former senior manager showed that until 1988 the council held the best 
record in EU funding absorption (from the interview with a former manager, Council 2). 
Until then, the senior manager and the council leader had developed personal, informal 
networks with EU officers and politicians responsible for the EU programmes. The 
personal (or informal) networks allowed the senior manager to have immediate 
information and to know the preferences and directions of the funding committees in the 
EC. However, the 1988 reform of the European Structural funds changed the rules of the 
game. The European Commission, in consultation with the member states and their 
regions, were now responsible for allocating the funds, the amount depending on the 
economic situation of each region (therefore not having to deal with the local councils 
directly anymore). The Government Offices for each region were appointed to allocate 
the funds between the Local Authorities, on the bases of guidelines decided during the 
consultation with the European Commission and listed in the Single Programming 
Document (SPD). That meant lots of effort was going in creating a strategy to be part of 
the eligible areas. Then, the local councils would compete between themselves and 
through their regional bodies. After the 1988 reform, local networks became a key 
element for developing EU projects and to show that the local strategy would fit the 
wider regional strategy. Council 2 failed to adapt to the changing situation and to enter 
the new networks that were being created which included regional officers and local 
organisations. In addition to this, the senior manager retired and surely he brought away 
with him lots of his personal networks.  
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The comparison between successful and unsuccessful cases is interesting for two reasons: 
first, it shows how the development of local networks is a top-down phenomenon which 
is enforced by the EU institutions; second, it shows a link between success in EU funding 
absorption and the presence of local EU funding networks. The creation of local networks 
increased the chances of successful bids, therefore, the involvement of many new local 
organisations in the structural funds networks (see Table 5).  
 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
The Italian local councils. 
 
Considering the accuracy and particularity of the EU Structural Funds we would expect 
to find in Italy similar types of networks. Instead, the four successful Italian cases showed 
a different pattern of European funding networks. They did not have established, well-
defined Local European Funding Networks but they developed (what the authors have 
defined as) ad hoc networks, meaning that the local councils would put together only 
partners that could serve a specific project. The partners would bring into the project 
expertise in developing the project and matching funds. For example, Council 6 
developed projects which included local businesses, a theatre, and a local school. 
Similarly, Council 8 developed projects which included the local community involved in 
tourism and also the local schools. Various local organisations were brought together by 
the local council to cooperate in specific projects. A different project would see the 
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involvement of different partners which would serve the purpose.  
 
In all four cases, the researcher identified the presence of a key actor, FinPiemonte, 
which appeared to be involved in most of the EU funded projects developed by the local 
councils. FinPiemonte, a semi-public consultancy organisation partly financed by 
Piedmont Region and partly self-supported, appeared in most EU funded projects 
investigated. It provided expertise and helped the local partners in administering the 
projects. In some cases it provided matching-funds. The omnipresence of FinPiemonte in 
EU funded projects demonstrated that the region tried to control the quality and the 
delivery of the projects. From the region’s point of view, the main concern was the 
delivery of the projects. A regional senior officer commented how important was for the 
region to show to the central government and to the European Commission that all funds 
devolved to Piedmont were spent efficiently. Showing efficiency in spending the 
assigned budget would reflect in easier negotiations for the following funding round 
(interview with a senior officer, Piedmont Region).  
All four cases developed a network of local councils, which they used in order to lobby at 
the regional level for the inclusion of their area in the Structural Funds programme. Once 
the period of negotiation with the region was over, the climate turned into a more 
competitive one.  
At the regional level, the local councils developed strong links with the regional officers. 
The region represented the key actor in EU funding application and it decided over the 
EU projects approval. As a public officer from Council 6 commented, most of the 
information on EU funds came from the regional offices. The region was considered as 
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an important filter of information coming from the EU and it represented a key actor in 
the EU funding competition. A regional committee decided over the EU funding criteria 
and approved the projects presented for financial support. Therefore, it was important to 
maintain periodical contacts with the regional officers. Also, knowing “the right person” 
could save time and help to overcome bureaucratic blockage.  
 
The network with the region, in seeking support for EU funded projects, followed the 
political party route. For example, the mayor of Council 6 was affiliated to the same party 
governing the region. This allowed the council to have a direct line of communication 
with the region and overcome difficulties. Information such as the number of projects 
presented under each priority would allow the council to present its project under a less 
competitive priority, giving it more chances to win. Council 10 instead, which belonged 
to a different political group, admitted that the relationship with the regional officers and 
politicians was difficult. In some occasions they had to stretch for political support to the 
national level in order to overcome bureaucratic difficulties which were impeding them to 
submit a certain project (interview with a senior manager, Council 10).  
 
At the national level, the Association of Italian Communes (ANCI) represented an 
important institutional network where all local councils could participate. It acted as 
diffuser of information on future funding opportunities. It developed a web page in order 




At the European level, networks were rare. The interviews revealed that networks at the 
European level were a prerogative of bigger councils, while the smaller ones considered 
that activity expensive and time consuming and preferred to focus on regional networks. 
Therefore, only Council 9, being a city-region and having available extensive resources 
in terms of money and people, engaged in direct links with the European institutions by 
participating in international networks (for example, the major participated in the 
Committee of the Region). They also had the opportunity to recruit a high calibre senior 
manager who had previously worked in the European Commission and still held 
extensive professional networks in Brussels. As revealed during the interviews with the 
senior manager, contacts with the members of the European Commission and the relevant 
DGs were mainly informal and non-institutional since the local council did not have the 
power to meet them in institutionalised networks. Only the region was expected/allowed 
to negotiate at the European level.  
 
While in some cases the creation of ad hoc partnership represented a higher flexibility 
and ability to adapt to specific circumstances, Council 6 showed that ad hoc partnerships 
could become an element of high instability and drive the project to failure. The recent 
local council elections in Council 6 saw the opposition succeeding. The new party in 
power seemed to dislike the previous projects and attempted to change the objectives of 
the current EU funded projects. This added further delays in the implementation of the 
projects. At the end, the team was not able to meet the deadlines and it concluded in the 
failure of the project (from the interview with a public officer, Council 6). 
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Council 7 represented an unsuccessful Italian case. Similarly to Council 2, the 
unsuccessful Italian council did not reveal any type of regeneration and/or EU funding 
network, neither presented ad hoc networks, typical of its neighbouring councils. The 
interview with a senior manager revealed that the council had suffered from a high 
inactivity of its governmental body during the period of formulation of the Docup4, which 
caused the exclusion of its territory from the eligibility for the Structural Funds 
Programme. It is significant that Council 7 did not take part in the provincial network 
created by its neighbouring councils (among which Council 6 and Council 8) for the 
inclusion of the provincial territory in the Docup. This could be explained by the political 
instability that affected the council between 1990-93 and successively by the election of 
an anti-Europeanist party5 to lead the local government (from the interview with the 
senior manager, Council 7).  
 
With the exception of Council 9, the Italian councils did not present any formal or 
informal network with the European organisations and showed that small councils found 
more profitable to “play” at the regional level. The European level was considered far to 
reach and requiring a higher number of resources, therefore the local councils preferred to 
invest their energies in trying to influence the EU funding decisions taken at the regional 
level. Council 9 appeared in the present analysis as an exception (see table 6). 
 





The descriptive analysis of the EU funding networks applied to the eight local councils 
raised a few points of discussion. 
 
Formal vs. informal networks. The analysis of the cases showed the co-existence of 
formal and informal networks.  These informal networks were developed in situations 
where the local councils were not supposed to initiate a relationship with the EU 
institutions. Therefore, the informal networks were adopted to overcome certain 
bureaucratic blockage. These findings recall the interorganisational approach which 
differentiated between informal networks as friendship links between actors and formal 
networks as the chain of authority within the organisations. It highlighted this mode of 
network as a possible solution to structural inefficiency (Granovetter, 1985; Kanter, 
1983).  
In our cases, the informal networks were described by the spokespersons as “informal 
discussions”. The term highlighted the complete informality and un-engaging nature of 
the contacts, based on a pure form of exchange of information. They were described as 
friendship links between actors that had previously worked together (as in the case of a 
senior manager in Council 1) or friendly relationships developed at workshops or 
conferences (as stated by a senior manager in Council 9). The personal type of network 
meant that when the relevant person was leaving the organisation, he/she would bring 
away also the relevant informal networks. This could partly explain the unsuccessful 
Council 2. The council was very good at attracting EU funds before the 1988 reform of 
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the Structural Funds and before the senior manager responsible for the funding 
application retired. When the senior manager left he brought with him all his personal 
contacts with the European officials.  
According to the above findings a new element or dimension should be added to the 
policy network model. The formal vs. informal dimension of a network could explain a 
type of relationship developed by individuals within organisations which should not – 
officially and institutionally – take part in the policy-making mechanism. In order to 
achieve this, we need to combine two levels of analysis the meso and micro-levels. 
Rhodes applied policy network as a meso-level of analysis, focusing on structural 
relationships between political institutions, and excluded the micro or interpersonal level 
from the analysis. This neat separation from a theoretical perspective risks making 
researchers to loose touch with the reality. The Multi-Level Governance approach 
showed an increasing number of organisations which started to take part in the policy-
making process in the EU; organisations that should not be there such as the local 
councils. This new behaviour where local councils feed into the policy-making process of 
the EU and vice-versa cannot be understood if we don’t look also at the micro-level. 
Therefore, networks do not just refer to formal, institutional links between different 
organisational roles but they include informal, personal relations between individuals 
who are part and shape the networks they belong to. 
 
Type of networks. The local networks described above fit Rhodes’ typology of policy 
networks where interdependent organisations compete for resources. In the local 
structural funds networks investigated, the resources took the form of EU funds, as well 
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as influence over policy-making at the local and European level. The comparison based 
on Rhodes continuum of policy community-issues networks helped to identify further 
differences between the eight successful councils in Italy and England. 
The English Local Regeneration Networks fit Rhodes’ definition of intergovernmental 
network. They comprised a limited number of participants (the eligible organisations 
within the local area), frequent interactions on all matters related to regeneration and 
development of the area. The links between the members of the network were exchange 
relationships. They exchanged political contacts, expertise, and intelligence to identify 
poor areas which could enter the EU definition of eligible areas under the European 
Structural Funds. They had an extensive range of interests, which varied from training 
and education to environment and culture.  
The English Local European Funding Networks corresponded to Rhode’s professional 
networks. They were characterised by one type of professionals, the European funding 
officers from the partners’ organisations. They all had a substantial common interest, 
which was to develop EU funded projects.  
The ad hoc local networks identified in the Italian cases appear to fit Rhodes’ definition 
of producer network, which represented the role of public and private sector economic 
interests in policy-making. They were characterised by changing membership and limited 
interdependence. They were unstable networks and they lasted for the duration of the 
project. 
 
Stability of networks. A striking difference in the EU funding networks between the 
Italian and the English local councils is the stability vs. instability of those networks. If 
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we look at chart 1, we can observe a clear trend where more stable English networks are 
characterised by a higher flow of funds. On the other hand, the Italian local councils with 
their unstable, ad hoc networks seemed less capable of attracting EU funds.  
Provan and Milward (2001) examined the interorganisational networks and their 
effectiveness. According to the authors there is no ideal number of organisations, 
however effective networks would attract and retain members. Especially, effective 
networks are expected to show a core of agencies central to the services delivered. This 
type of behaviour could be observed in the English networks which showed a group of 
organisations central to the life and operation of the network. The ad hoc networks 
observed in the Italian cases were more volatile and changing with the projects. The only 
organisation central to the various European funding networks developed in the area was 
the local council which appeared (and usually was driving) every EU funding application. 
Also, the ad hoc Italian networks did not have an independent administrative body but 
they were administered and managed by the local councils. The “lower” success of the 
Italian councils compared to their English counterpart could be related to the lack of 
stability in the Italian networks. On the other hand, by working together, the local 
councils and the local partner-organisations learn to trust each other and to benefit from 
the cooperation. They contribute therefore to the building of social capital, meaning that 
they create the antecedent for future – more successful – cooperation (Putnam, 1993). 
 
Levels of networks. Briefly, four levels of networks were identified in our analysis.  
The European level included networks between the local authorities and the EU 
institutions (those were merely informal networks) and between the local authorities 
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themselves at an international level to build up partnerships.  
A national level of networks, between local authorities and national institutions involved 
in the EU funding procedures (central government’s department), appeared only in 
Council 10 where the mayor used political party links to overcome bureaucratic 
difficulties with the region.  
The regional level of networks appeared well-developed in both the countries. In England 
this included links between the council, the RDA and the GO. In Italy the local councils 
showed systematic communication with the regional officers (often using the political 
party channels) and they also presented provincial networks between neighbouring local 
councils in order to enter the regional competition.  
The local level of networks between the local councils and local actors (universities 
business centres, chamber of commerce, voluntary sector, local businesses) appeared as 
extremely important for the development of EU funded projects. In England it took the 
form of institutionalised, stable partnerships (Regeneration Networks and European 
Networks), while in Italy these appeared as more unstable, ad hoc partnership for the 




Despite the growing number of studies on policy networks and multi-level governance, 
the field remains relatively unexplored at local government level. In particular, there is a 
lack of research on Italian local government. This study contributed to the local 
government literature by describing the local European funding networks developed in a 
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small number of local councils in Italy and England. The comparative analysis generated 
important differences in the development of local networks. The results suggested two 
types of correlation. Firstly, a correlation between the amount of funding absorbed and 
the type of networks developed at the local level. The more successful English councils 
where characterised by professional networks while the Italian councils developed 
producer type of networks. Secondly, a correlation between the funding absorbed and the 
existence of networks. Councils 2 and 7 which did not participate to the EU funding 
competition did not develop any local EU funding networks.   
 
This study comes with a limitation. It is a case study analysis on a small sample of local 
councils; therefore, the results cannot be generalisable without further quantitative 
testing.   
Despite the above limitation this exploratory study is important because it focuses on the 
appearance of policy networks at the local government level and identifies a potential 
link between the absorption of EU funding and the types of networks developed by the 
local councils.  
This study may provide important policy implications. It implies that those local 
European funding networks might not be “durable” and they might come to an end when 



























Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Local government structure in Italy and England 
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ENGLAND  ITALY 
Regional Development Agencies Regioni 
County Councils  
Unitary Councils  
District Councils  
-non county borough councils 
-urban district councils 





Table 2: Description of the 10 city councils analysed. 
City Councils in 
Yorkshire3 and 
Humber, UK  
1994-99 Funds (GBP) Type of Local 
Authority 
Population 
Case 4 18,566,496.00 Unitary Authority 156,243  
Case 3 12,341,728.00 Metropolitan Borough 290,468 
Case 5 10,371,162.00 Metropolitan Borough 395,131 
Case 1 8,748,935.00 Metropolitan Borough  228,103 
Case 2 0.00 Metropolitan Borough 192,824  
City Councils in 
Piedmont, Italy 
   
Case 6 6,262,088.00 Commune 26,724 
Case 10 2,965,570.29 
Commune (Provincial 
Capital)  30,307 
Case 8  1,684,886.31 Commune 28,886 
Case 9 6,403,416.03 
Commune (Regional 
Capital)  909,741 




Table 3: Description of source of evidence during data collection. 
 Archival records Focused interviews Structured 
interviews 
Document analysis 
Case 1 GOYH: data 
relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 














                                                 
3
 Yorkshire and Humber region included four sub-areas of which three were eligible under the Objective 2 
of the structural funds (South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and the Humber. Piedmont region included six 
provinces of which three were eligible (Alessandria, Torino and Verbanio-Cusio-Ossola). 
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funds absorbed by 
each council 
(at present MEP) departmental 
structure; 
summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 2 GOYH: data 
relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 





Policy Officer;  
Former European 








summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 3 GOYH: data 
relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 















summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 4 GOYH: data 
relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 





EU Funding Unit, 
Senior Manager; 










summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 5 GOYH: data 
relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 















summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 6 Regione Piemonte: 
data relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 
















summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 7 Regione Piemonte: 
data relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 
funds absorbed by 











each council structure; 
summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 8 Regione Piemonte: 
data relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 
funds absorbed by 
each council 
 Vice-Segretario – 









summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 9 Regione Piemonte: 
data relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 
funds absorbed by 
each council 










summaries of EU 
funded projects 
Case 10 Regione Piemonte: 
data relative to the 
amount of funds 
available within 
the region and 
funds absorbed by 
each council 















Table 4: Unemployment rates (Sources: National Statistics and ISTAT) 




Case 2 (UK) Non-Eligible 5.9 
Case 4 (UK) Eligible 6.2 
Leeds (UK) Eligible 4.9 
Wakefield (UK) Eligible 6.0 
West Yorkshire 
(partly eligible) 
Partly Eligible 6.1 
Case 7 (It) Non-Eligible 7.0 





Table 5. Local Structural Funds Networks. England. This table summarises the types of 
local EU structural funds networks identified by the researcher in the five English cases. 
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It also shows the role of the networks and the organisations involved. 
 Local 
Network 
Participating Organisations Role of the Network Type of network 
Case 1  LRN 
 
-Council, Chamber of 
Commerce, College, Voluntary 






LEFN -Experts on EU funding from 
the Regeneration Forum. 










-Council, TEC, voluntary 
groups, private sector, college, 
local community.  





LEFN -European officers and 
managers from partners’ 
organisations involved in 
delivering Objective 2 funded 
projects  
  
-Coordinate and assist 
organisations in developing 
and delivering EU funded 




Case 4  LRN 
 
-Council, TEC, Business Link, 
colleges, local community, 
voluntary sector 




LEFN -European officers and 
managers from partners’ 
organisations. 
-Administer and coordinate 
the Objective 2 programme 
for the area 
Professional 
Network 
Case 5  LRN 
 
-Council, TEC, Business Link, 
colleges, local community, 
voluntary sector.  





LEFN -Council, university, colleges, 
TEC, voluntary sector, chamber 
of commerce, and local 
community. 
-Coordinate and develop 





Table 6. Local Structural Funds networks. Italy. This table summarises the types of local 
EU structural funds networks identified by the researcher in the five Italian cases and it 





Role of Network Type of network 
Case 6  Ad hoc 
network  
Council, FinPiemonte, Turin 
theatre, local businesses, 
local banks, schools, 
university, PST (Technology 
Park), Chamber of 
commerce. 
Implement and manage 
specific EU funded projects.   
Producer network 
Case 7  - - -  
 36 
Case 8  Ad hoc 
network  
Council, FinPiemonte, local 
businesses, local bank, 
schools. 
Implement and manage 
specific EU funded projects 
Producer network 
Case 9  Ad hoc 
network  
Council, FinPiemonte, local 
businesses, local banks, 
schools, university, 
voluntary organisations, 
local community, chamber 
of commerce. 
Implement and manage 
specific EU funded projects 
Producer network 
Case 10  Ad hoc 
network  
Council, FinPiemonte, local 
businesses, local bank, local 
community.  
Implement and manage 




Figure 1. Total European Structural Funds (Objective 2) in the 10 Italian and English 
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1
 The LAP includes a detailed analysis of the problems of the local area and its solution. It shows how 
much money is needed to redevelop the area and what sort of sources of funds is available. 
2
 As projects applications are called in the local authority’s jargon. 
3
 This is a new professional figure appearing in public and not-for-profit organisations responsible for 
investing and managing EU funded projects. 
4
 Documento Unico di Programmazione. It is the equivalent of the Single Programming Document for 
England. 
5
 The party in power was an extremist group of Lega Nord, which was concerned mainly with secessionist 
ideas. It was totally oriented against a European policy and was also disconnected from the Province and 
from the neighbouring local authorities, and therefore their European strategy. 
